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On August 30, 2007, the California Supreme Court issued its much-awaited decision in Gentry v. Superior Court, a case addressing the enforceability of a class action waiver contained in a pre-dispute employment arbitration agreement. In a split decision, a majority of the Court effectively invalidates the use of such waivers in overtime cases alleging violations of California's Labor Code. In 1995, while employed by Circuit City, Gentry received an "Associate Issue Resolution Package" and a copy of the company's "Dispute Resolution Rules and Procedures" setting forth various procedures for resolving employment-related disputes. The documents contained an arbitration agreement that included a class action waiver provision. The company provided each employee with 30 days to opt out of the arbitration agreement, but Gentry did not do so. Gentry later filed a lawsuit in California state court seeking recovery of overtime on behalf of himself and a purported class of similarly-situated Circuit City employees. Circuit City moved to compel arbitration. The trial court compelled arbitration, subject to the class action waiver. The appellate court affirmed, and in a 4-3 decision, the California Supreme Court reversed, issuing a decision which will come as welcome news to plaintiff's class action lawyers in California. Overtime Claims Are Not Subject To Class Action Waiver In addressing the class action waiver, the Court relied upon its earlier decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, which had invalidated a class action waiver included in a mandatory pre-dispute credit card agreement. In Discover Bank, the Court reasoned that the class action waiver in effect insulated the bank from liability, because the amounts in dispute under the consumer protection laws at issue were so small that consumers had no incentive to bring individual claims. In Gentry, the Court addressed similar concerns in the employment context. While stopping short of a blanket ruling invalidating all class action waivers involving any statutory employment claims, the Court's analysis effectively renders such clauses unenforceable in overtime and most other wage and hour cases. Under Gentry, a trial court must consider a range of factors in considering whether, under the circumstances presented, a class action waiver included in an otherwise enforceable arbitration agreement is valid. The factors discussed by the Court are:
The Court held that if, based upon its consideration of these three factors, as well as "other real world obstacles to the vindication of class members' rights," a trial court determines that class arbitration is likely to be more effective in vindicating the rights of affected employees, and that barring class claims will lead to "a less comprehensive enforcement" of the statutory rights at issue, the class arbitration waiver should be invalidated. As a practical matter, the required analysis will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to enforce class action waivers of any claims alleging denial of overtime and/or most other wage and hour violations brought under California law. Circuit City's Agreement Contains Elements of Procedural Unconscionability The Gentry decision also furnishes guidance on the issue of procedural unconscionability in the arbitration context. As a general matter, a court may refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement that purports to require arbitration of claims asserting non-waivable statutory rights, where it finds the agreement is unconscionable. The Supreme Court identified the essential requirements of procedural and substantive unconscionability in its earlier decision in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services. There, the Court noted that procedural unconscionability generally takes the form of a contract of adhesion, drafted by one party, and imposed upon the party with the weaker bargaining power. The Armendariz decision addressed "mandatory" arbitration, that is, a pre-dispute agreement between the employer and the employee requiring arbitration as a condition of employment. In Gentry, the Court considered application of procedural unconscionability requirements where the arbitration agreement is not mandatory, but is instead subject to a clause giving the employee the ability to "opt out" of the agreement. Not surprisingly, the Court observed that such an opt out clause furnishes a strong indication that the agreement is not procedurally unconscionable. However, the Supreme Court refused to go so far as to hold that the clause precluded a finding of procedural unconscionability. Instead, the Court observed that there were a number of elements of procedural unconscionability that were evident in the record, including the fact that Circuit City's explanation of its arbitration program was "one-sided" and did not adequately describe the disadvantages of arbitration for the employee. Where an agreement contains at least some elements of procedural unconscionability, Armendariz requires a full analysis of both procedural and substantive unconscionability, something which the trial court in Gentry had failed to do. Accordingly, the Court sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. In sum, beyond its narrow holding, the Gentry decision arguably reflects a strong endorsement of class action procedures in litigating wage and hour claims by a majority of the current California Supreme Court. While the case did not address class certification issues as such, we anticipate that plaintiff's attorneys will liberally quote this decision in seeking such certifications in the future. In short, the decision further stokes the fires of class action wage and hour litigation in California, and underscores the need for employers to carefully assess their compliance with all applicable wage and hour regulations.
On August 30, 2007, a lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California by the AFL-CIO, the National Immigration Law Center and the American Civil Liberties Union to enjoin the Social Security Administration (SSA) from sending out its no-match letters to employers. (See Schiff Hardin Labor and Employment Update issued August 17, 2007 [Link]). These organizations argued that the SSA lacks the authority to use tax data to enforce immigration laws. On August 31, 2007, the Court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent the SSA from sending out its no-match letters. This order will delay implementation of the revised regulations initially scheduled to go into effect on September 14, 2007. The Court has set an October 1st hearing date on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
Disagreeing with recent rulings from at least two federal district courts, the Illinois Court of Appeals recently ruled that Illinois' Whistleblower Act did not repeal by implication the state's long-recognized common law retaliatory discharge tort action for whistleblowing activities at least in situations where employees allege that they were discharged in retaliation for reporting illegal activities to their supervisors, as opposed to outside law enforcement or government agencies. In Callahan v. Edgewater Care & Rehabilitation Center, Inc., an admissions clerk at a nursing home alleged that she was terminated from her position for reporting to her superior and the home's administrator that a resident of the home was being kept in the facility against her will a situation that the clerk believed constituted a violation of the state's Nursing Home Act. She brought an action against her former employer claiming a common-law "retaliatory discharge" in violation of public policy, alleging she was discharged for engaging in "whistleblowing" activities. The nursing home sought to dismiss the action on the grounds that the retaliatory discharge claim for "whistleblowers" was preempted by the state's Whistleblower Act, which became effective January 1, 2004, and thus the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals disagreed, focusing on the language and intent of the Whistleblower Act. The Act, effective January 1, 2004, provides a statutory remedy for employees who suffer retaliation by their employers for "whistleblowing activities" i.e., disclosing illegal activity to law enforcement agencies or government agencies, or refusing to participate in illegal activities. Remedies under the Act include traditional tort damages as well as attorneys' fees and reinstatement to the employee's former position with full seniority. The common law retaliatory discharge tort claim, since first being recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1978, has evolved to afford damages to employees discharged for disclosing illegal activity to law enforcement agencies or government agencies or to their supervisors, for refusing to work under illegal or hazardous conditions, or for their activities where the discharge constitutes a violation of a clear public policy, such as in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. The Court noted that since the Whistleblower Act's passage, at least two federal district courts have ruled that the Whistleblower Act repealed by implication the retaliatory discharge action where an employee alleges discharge in retaliation for "whistleblowing" activities, even though the Act only provides relief to employees who report illegal activities to enforcement agencies, and not to those reporting such information to their supervisor or superiors. Noting this distinction, and noting that nothing in the statute suggested that the legislature intended to repeal or preempt the common law rights of individuals who choose to report internally instead of to outside agencies, the Court held that the Whistleblower Act did not repeal the common law cause of action in that situation, and reversed and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. This case serves as an important reminder that employers should take caution against employment actions that, however legal in intent, could be construed as retaliatory against employees who engage in whistleblowing-type activities whether internally or externally. Because there is a split between at least some of the federal district courts and the state appellate court regarding employees who choose to complain of unlawful activity internally, this decision could impact plaintiff-employees' choice of forum in actions against former employers. We will be monitoring the application of this decision and will keep you apprised of future developments on this topic.
This past July, Illinois joined the ranks of 21 other states in enacting a ban on smoking in all enclosed public places and places of employment. Effective January 1, 2008, the Smoke Free Illinois Act mandates that all Illinois employers, with a few exceptions, prohibit smoking indoors and within 15 feet of any entrance, exit, window that opens, or ventilation intake that serves enclosed areas. It also mandates that employers post "No Smoking" signs or the international "No Smoking" symbol (i.e., a picture of a burning cigarette with a red bar across it) in a conspicuous place in their facility and at every entrance, and allows employers to designate other non-enclosed areas, including outside areas, as "non-smoking." The law provides the Illinois Department of Public Health, local public health departments, and local law enforcement agencies with authority to enforce these prohibitions, and provides for penalties against employers who violate the Act, including fines of at least $250.00 for the first violation, $500.00 for the second violation within a year, and $2500.00 for the third violation within a year. Schiff Hardin on the Road Patricia Costello Slovak, "Work Life Balance Success: Defining the Environments that Strengthen the Success of Women and All Attorneys Alike," LexisNexis® Women in the Legal Profession Summit Conference, Philadelphia, Penn. (September 25, 2007) [Link]
Schiff Hardin Labor and Employment Group |
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