On February 26, 2008, in Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, the United States Supreme Court clarified and broadened the scope of evidence that can be considered relevant to a plaintiff's discrimination claim to include evidence of discrimination against non-parties by supervisors who played no role in making the adverse employment action challenged by a plaintiff. The court also considered the proper role of the district and appellate courts in evaluating the admissibility of such evidence.

The case involved an age discrimination claim brought by a former employee who had been terminated as part of a reduction-in-force. The plaintiff sought to introduce testimony at trial from five non-party witnesses who were each expected to testify regarding instances of age discrimination they experienced or observed during their employment with the employer. Notably, none of the witnesses were similarly situated to the plaintiff — having worked for different departments and for different supervisors than she — nor had they observed any instances of discriminatory conduct perpetrated by the supervisor involved in the plaintiff's termination decision. In the prior proceedings, the District Court had excluded the testimony of those witnesses and indicated that the plaintiff could only offer evidence of discrimination against employees who had the same supervisor or could otherwise show that they were similarly situated to her. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, reviewed the evidence and concluded that the District Court had abused its discretion by applying a per se rule that evidence from employees who had not been supervised by the plaintiff's supervisor is irrelevant to proving discrimination.

The Supreme Court made two significant holdings with respect to this case. First, the Court concluded that the admissibility of evidence of discrimination from employees with other supervisors cannot be per se admissible, or per se inadmissible, but must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The Court stated that, "[t]he question of whether evidence of discrimination by other supervisors is relevant depends on many factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff's circumstances and theory of the case." The Court also stated that the relevance of such evidence must be determined by a "fact intensive, context specific inquiry."

Second, the Court held that, because the District Court had not provided sufficient insights concerning the rationale for its decision to exclude the evidence, the Court of Appeals erred in not only evaluating and weighing the evidence, but also in presuming that the District Court reached an incorrect legal conclusion. Instead, the Court of Appeals should have requested clarification from the District Court regarding the rationale behind its decision because the District Court was best suited for making a determination regarding the relevance of, or prejudice caused by, evidence before it.

While the full impact of this decision is unclear, the holding potentially broadens the range of information that may be deemed relevant in discrimination cases. It also reaffirms the role the district and appellate courts should play with respect to determining the admissibility of such evidence. Please contact any member of Schiff Hardin's Labor and Employment Group if you have any questions about this decision.